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1. Introduction 
    The Mekong River flows about 4,800 kilometers from the Plateau of Tibet at an 
elevation of over 5,000 meters to the South China Sea near Ho Chi Minh City (the 
"Mekong Region"). This majestic and mighty river may have always welcomed external 
visitors with amazing or frightening sensations throughout the past. On the other hand, 
the indigenous residents have lived on and with the River, to gain livings by fishery or 
agriculture, aswell as suffer from floods, for centuries. 
    There has been an increase inenvironmental studies focused on the Mekong Region 
recently.' Many of these studies by external researchers tend to stress that development 
should not be conducted or managed as "top-down" style decision-making from the 
central government, with the assistance of foreign donors who are all external to the local 
communities. 
    Notwithstanding these recent environmental discussions, there have been a series of 
consistent and considerable efforts to organize r gional economic development schemes in 
the Mekong Region initiated mainly by Asian regional organizations since the early post-
Second World War era.
* Satoru Akiba is a doctoral student of Business History at the Graduate School of 
Commerce, Waseda University, Japan. 
' See Fox (2000), Friesen (1999), Kagawa (2002, 2003), Kasai (2003a, 2003b), 
Matsumoto (1997). 
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    The first initiative was started by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)' which came into being in 1947. h began with an idea for 
flood control in the Lower Mekong River basin in the early 1950s, with implications of
multipurpose hydro development. Ashydroelectric development came to gain privilege 
over navigation after the Second World War, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the "TVA") 
came to be recognized internationally as a model and preliminary step to wider 
development. 
    ECAFE saw the Mekong Region consisting of different and independent countries 
as an integrated economic unit for this specific regional development. Several discussions 
based on reconnaissance surveys and following reports in the Mekong River led to the 
formation of the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong 
Basin (the "Mekong Committee") as a permanent body in 1957 among Cambodia, Laos, 
South Vietnam, and Thailand (the "Riparian Counties"). 
    Before the establishment of he Mekong Committee, ECAFE had already drawn up 
a TVA-style development plan, the "Mekong Development Scheme". This is because 
ECAFE considered the project one of the most important regional economic ooperation 
undertakings. 
    The Mekong Development Scheme was illustrated with a series of gigantic dams for 
the multipurpose of flood control, hydro power generation, irrigation, and navigation 
improvement. Figure 1 shows the principal idea of the Lower Mekong River 
Development plan together with the Tennessee Valley plan developed by the TVA. 
    In the end, the Mekong Committee failed to construct any one of the mainstream 
dams, though it had managed to survive the drastic political changes in the Mekong 
Region. However, in the middle of the 1990s, it became almost impossible for any 
international organization tolead any hydro development plan. 
    This paper argues that the Mekong Development Scheme was the first Asian 
initiative to pursue an opportunity for economic integration and explores the current 
implications of it. As a theoretical starting point, we look into the definition of economic 
integration which originated in Europe to see if the definition can apply to Asia. Then, 
based on the regional differences between Asia and Europe, this paper sees that TVA-style 
regional development was the missing function eeded for economic ntegration i Asia. 
After that, we look through the history of the Mekong Development Scheme and
' ECAFE was reorganized and transformed into the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in 1974.
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Figure 1. The Lower Mekong River Development Plan and the Tennessee Valleyplan
developed by the TVA
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examine the implications of the TVA in the context of the Mekong Development 
Scheme, leading to the conclusion. 
2. International and Regional Settings towards Economic Integration: Asia versus 
  Europe 
2.1 Definition of Economic Integration 
    As a theoretical starting point, we look into the definition of economic integration 
of The Theory of Economic Integration, which is considered animportant source. Balassa 
(1961: pp.1-2) defines economic integration asfollows: 
     ... as a process and as a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it encompasses 
    measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to 
    different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented bythe 
    absence of various forms of discrimination between ational economies. In 
    interpreting our definition, distinction should be made between integration and 
    cooperation. The difference isqualitative as well as quantitative.... Distinguishing 
    between cooperation a d integration, we put the main characteristics of the latter --
    the abolition of discrimination within an area -- into clearer focus.... Economic 
    integration, asdefined here, can take several forms that represent varying degrees of
     integration. These are a free-trade area, a custom union, a common market, an 
    economic union, and complete conomic ntegration. 
    It should be noted here that all the forms of economic integration defined by 
Balassa exclude conomic cooperation which should be presupposed as an essential part of 
economic ntegration. Referring to the situation of forming economic integration, Balassa 
(ibid: p.3) also writes: 
    In the twentieth century no significant customs unions were formed until the end of 
    the Second World War, although several ttempts had been made to integrate the 
    economies ofvarious European countries. Without going into a detailed analysis, 
    political obstacles can be singled out as the main causes for the failure of these 
    projects to materialize. A certain degree of integration was achieved uring the 
    Second World War via a different route, when -- as part of the German Grossraum 
    policy -- the Hitlerites endeavored to integrate economically the satellite countries 
    and the occupied territories with Germany. In the latter case, economic integration 
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    appeared as a form of imperialist expansion. 
    As Balassa implies here, economic integration eeds ome initiatives in certain 
settings. Therefore, we proceed to examine the international nd regional settings m find 
if it is appropriate oapply this definition for our further discussion. 
2.2 The International and Regional Settings 
    Both Asia and Europe were in the same international settings in the post-World War 
Two era for the purposes ofour discussion. First, it was Asia and Europe, the world's two 
most war-devastated areas that needed pressing and urgent reconstruction. Singh (1966: 
p.18) explains the establishment of ECAFE and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) in 1947: 
    The first two of the United Nations regional economic Commissions came into 
    being as a result of the Organization's response to the challenge of economic 
    reconstruction f those member countries which had suffered war devastation.
    Secondly, the Cold War loomed uring the course of the War reconstruction. It was 
also the year of 1947 when the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) terminated its work, due to the refusal to continue on the part of the United 
States which was the main financial contributor. UNRRA was set up by the Allied Powers 
for emergency relief and rehabilitation towards the end of the war. Singh (ibid: p.18) 
describes the changing situation in the context of establishing ECAFE and ECE: 
    As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union, the occupying power in Eastern Europe, had 
    turned from an ally to a competitor of the United States. A new organization was 
    needed to take up the work left incomplete by UNRRA. 
    On the other hand, the regional settings related to economic integration were totally 
different in Asia and Europe. This was because most Asian colonies gained independence 
from European powers in the early postwar era, while the pattern of economic relation 
and cooperation between Asia and the old European colonial powers was still one of the 
strong bilateral links after independence. 
    There existed acertain initiative from Asian countries to seek economic integration, 
considering that the Marshall Offer for Europe in 1947 was an overall approach totackle 
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the problem of planning reconstruction  a regional basis. Singh (ibid: p.143) observes: 
    Ever since ECAFE came into being, regional economic integration has been a 
    subject of lively debate, At its second session, in November, 1947, the Commission, 
     on India's initiative, instructed the secretariat to review the programs for 
     reconstruction a d development i  the countries ofthe region.... The secretariat, in 
    cooperation with experts from India, China, the Philippines, and Thailand, 
    prepared an over-all estimate of the financial resources needed and suggested an 
    over-all planning approach to tackle the problem of reconstruction on a regional 
    basis. The refusal of the Western powers to allow ECAFE to assume the task of 
    channeling aid and the lack of interest among the regional countries in a region-
    wide program as against national schemes rendered the whole study fruitless. 
    This lack of interest towards economic integration among the Asian countries 
explains the differences of the regional settings between Asia and Europe. Singh (ibid: 
p.227) further explains: 
    The obstacles to regional economic ooperation and integration in the ECAFE 
    region may be grouped under three main headings, psychological, economic, and 
    political, in reverse order of importance. During the colonial era the Asian countries 
    had neither the traditions nor the institutions for intraregional cooperation.... Even 
    after the end of the colonial period no serious attempt was made by influential 
    groups of Asian leaders to propagate inAsia the need for closer contacts between the 
    national elites in order to create apsychological basis for cooperation as was done in 
    Europe by Jean Monnet of France and his Committee for Action on European 
    Economic Unity. Asia is lagging behind Latin America in this respect. 
    Asia was still in the midst of chaos, just a few years after the end of the war, with the 
Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, or "Asia for Asians" initiated by Japan. Even after the 
war, newly independent countries in Asia also witnessed closely that domestic 
insurgencies had led Tibet to be "integrated" into Communist China. It was a serious 
concern for newly independent countries, especially for smaller countries in Asia, to 
maintain their independence and territories before proceeding to discuss economic 
cooperation a d integration. There have been persistent disputes or armed conflicts over 
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the borders of neighboring countries following independence.' 'Ihe term "integration" 
was not entirely welcomed by Asian countries. This reluctance implicitly reveals the 
feelings of prevailing political distrust among Asian countries. 
2.3 Implications Based on the Differences r garding Economic Integration i  Asia 
    Even though Asia and Europe were in the same international settings inthe early 
post-World War II era, their positions regarding economic ntegration were quite 
different. Asia was even struggling to find the way to economic cooperation, which 
presupposed economic integration, a d the differing relationships with the opponents in 
the Cold War had further accentuated their variance. On the other hand, the Cold War 
played an implicit role in facilitating Western Europe's move towards economic 
integration. With these findings, we will return to Balassa's definition of economic 
integration. 
    Balassa's main interest isto analyze the dynamic effects of economic integration, 
which varies in degree inaccordance with his definition, as well as the conventional 
approach toresource allocation i a static framework. His definition isbased on the 
implicit assumption that discrimination between economic units actually affects 
economic intercourse. Therefore, in the absence of a substantial amount offoreign trade, 
there is no effective discrimination. His theoretical interest is not related to the process 
towards economic integration, a d The Theory of Economic Integration does not explain 
the process ofeconomic cooperation a d integration. This is the reason why Balassa 
intentionally excludes conomic cooperation from his definition ofeconomic integration 
in his analysis. 
   Black (1969: p.33), the former President of the World Bank, clarifies this point in 
the context ofSoutheast A ia: 
    Although economic ties among the nations of Southeast Asia are beginning to
    appear, the important lines on an economic map charting the flow of trade and 
    investment in the region lead far away, to Japan, Europe, and the United States. The 
    countries of Southeast A ia for the most part sell raw materials onthe world market 
    in competition with one another: ice from Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and 
    Vietnam; tin and rubber f om Indonesia and Malaysia; teak and mahogany from the
s It is exemplified by a recent incident in claiming territory over th
e 
between Cambodia and Thailand, which dates back to 1958. 
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Prah Vihera Temple
     Philippines, Burma, and Thailand. A common market on the European model will 
     not make sense in Southeast Asia for a long time to come. 
     Because of the lack of a relevant theory and a precedent path towards economic 
cooperation and integration, we need to change course and single out a recognized case in 
Asia. In this context, Singh (ibid: p.127) mentions the Mekong Development Scheme: 
    The most important of ECAFE's efforts to bring the countries of the region to 
     cooperation  practical tasks and the one that has secured recognition as a model 
    of constructive international cooperation is the project for the development of the 
     water esources of the lower Mekong River. 
    Since Singh only writes that the Mekong Development Scheme was "a model of 
constructive international cooperation we must look for the missing factor, by and 
through which collaboration could be transformed from economic ooperation to 
economic integration i Asian regional settings. 
3 TVA-Style Development as the Missing Function Resulting in Economic 
  Integration 
    The TVA itself is a government corporation of the United States created by the 
1933 TVA Act. The principal concept of the Act is to maintain and utilize such 
government assets as Wilson Dam and the nitrate plants built near Muscle Shoals, 
Alabama going hack to the First World War for national defense in wartime and for 
efficient chemical fertilizer production i  peacetime. 
    The Tennessee River Basin, one of the underdeveloped r gions in the United States, 
was successfully developed in an integrated manner by the TVA. In the early 1940s, the 
idea of a Tennessee Valley Authority on an international scale had spread widely, to such 
valleys as the Amazon, Danube, Yangtze, tc. According to Ekbladh (2002: p.346), the 
Office of War Information of the United States distributed some 50,000 translation 
copies of TVA: Democracy on the March, written by David Lilienthal, to China alone by 
1945. 
    Despite high expectations for export of the TVA, there had been few cases of 
multipurpose river basin development seen in Asia after the war. Wightman (1963: 
p.176) writes:
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    The Damodar Valley Corporation in India and the ICtakami Special Area in Japan 
    are as yet the only two notable examples in Asia of multipurpose river basin 
    development. 
    Since both projects in India and Japan were not on an international basis, the 
Mekong Development Scheme was the first international case. Moreover, it should have 
ultimately envisaged setting up a joint development or management organization(s) like 
the TVA by the Riparian Countries in the course of the Mekong Development Scheme. 
Black (ibid: p.148) notes: 
    The World Bank has already offered to make legal assistance available to the 
    (Mekong) Committee in its efforts to devise atreaty and ultimately an authority or 
    authorities governing main-stream projects like Pa Mong. 
    Therefore, if any one of the planned ams on the main stream of the Mekong River 
had been built and operated, the Mekong Development Scheme might have further 
transformed into any form of economic integration i Asia. Wightman (ibid: p.199) also 
points out its rationale: 
    It is difficult, moreover, to see how the benefits of the Mekong Project can be 
    achieved without a large measure ofeconomic ntegration among them. 
    As we can say that the Mekong Development Scheme is a recognized case of 
economic cooperation i  Asia, we proceed to investigate i shistory. 
4 Origins: 1951 to 1957 
4.1 Creation of the Bureau of Flood Control in 1949 
    In Asia, about half the population lived in river valleys where the Asian monsoon 
climate caused uncontrolled and destructive flooding from the rivers periodically. Under 
the scope of ECAFE to start work at the initial stage, flood control was recognized asan 
urgent and serious problem for the region, and the Bureau of Flood Control (the 
"Bureau") was created in 1949. The Bureau surveyed the extent and nature of flood 
damage and control practices in the region. Wightman (ibid: p.176) writes: 
    Flood control had to be thought of as part of multipurpose d velopment over the 
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    entire basin of the river. This approach had been gaining favor in Asia following the 
    spectacular success ofthe Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States. Its 
    essence isthe impounding of water by a system of reservoirs in the rainy season, to 
    be released in the dry season for irrigation and navigation, simultaneously 
    producing hydroelectric power. Soil conservation, reforestation, fish culture, malaria 
    control, and recreation facilities are also part of multipurpose river basin 
    development. Many flood control plans in the region have been revised in the light 
    of this approach. 
    The Bureau also started to organize a study tour to Australia, France, the 
Netherlands, and the United States in order for Asian specialists olearn about he most 
advanced techniques of multipurpose d velopment Wighrman (ibid: p.182) states that 
the Bureau was "one of ECAFE's most effective instruments ofcooperation' atthat time. 
4.2 From Flood Control to Multipurpose Development: 1951 to 1952 
    Among the eighteen major international rivers in the areas of ECAFE, the Mekong 
River was selected for detailed studies of the Bureau for rather passive reasons. The rivers 
in China were a strong candidate but were excluded, because of assumed Communist 
control. The Indus River as another candidate was also ruled out because of Pakistan's 
distrust of the then executive s cretary, BS. Lokanathan, an Indian, against the backdrop 
of political tension between I dia and Pakistan. 
    In response to the approval of the Riparian Countries in 1951 for the idea of 
investigating the problems of flood control on the lower Mekong, the Bureau prepared a 
Preliminary Report on Technical Problems Relating to Flood Control and Water 
Resources Development of the Mekong -- An International River in 1952. The report 
pointed out that the Mekong had tremendous resources in respect to power, irrigation, 
and navigation, and proposed further detailed field surveys. It was the point when aa 
technical study of flood-control problems broadened into a comprehensive nvestigation 
of the potentialities of the river for multipurpose d velopment. 
4.3 Different Views towards Development: ECAFE versus the United States 
    During the standstill period caused by the Indochina War to 1954, the United 
States tarted to prepare for a similar project itself because of the importance of the 
Mekong Region in its global security programs. In 1955, the Bureau of Reclamation of
the United States Department of the interior (the "U.S. Reclamation Bureau") started its 
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own survey without prior consultation with ECAFE. Additionally, the 
exerted pressure to make ECAFE abandon the survey initiated by ECAFE. 
p.358) further describes it as follows:
United 
Ekbldh
States 
(ibid:
The Eisenhower administration 
to emphasize its own bilateral p 
study....
was at first hesitant about these efforts. It preferred 
rogram, which centered on a Bureau of Reclamation
    However, in early 1956, when the United States International Cooperation 
Administration (ICA) called a meeting of the Riparian Countries for development plans 
on the basis of the report of the U.S. Reclamation Bureau (the "ICA Report") captioned 
Lower Mekong River Basin: A Reconnaissance Report prepared for International 
Cooperation Administration, Cambodia did not attend. Cambodia intended to keep out 
of the Cold War entanglement a d it became clear that cooperation between the Riparian 
Countries was politically impossible under the auspices of the United States. 
Consequently, ECAFE organized its own team and finance from ECAFE funds to 
complete its own report captioned Development of Water Resources in the Lower 
Mekong Basin (the "ECAFE Report"). 
    Therefore, there were the two reports produced by the United States and ECAFE 
respectively, which were combined at a later stage. The two reports differed basically in 
terms of the approach to development. While the ICA Report suggested separate 
development projects for the individual Riparian Countries, the ECAFE report was 
comprehensive n presenting a vision of the potential joint development of the Mekong 
River together with estimated costs. Wightman (ibid: p188) describes it in the following 
way:
The ECAFE report outlined in some detail five possible mainstream projects: at Pa 
Mong, Khemarat, Khone Falls, Sambor, and on the Tonle Sap. Dams on the first 
four of these sites would generate power and improve navigation. Furthermore, Pa 
Mong and Sambor would provide gravity irrigation. The suggested barrage across 
the Tonle Sap had no power component but would help moderate the flooding of 
the delta area, improve navigation, and regulate river flow for irrigation and 
drainage purposes.... and the improvement of navigation up to Luang Prabang 
which would particularly benefit landlocked Laos.... ECAFE suggested that they be 
investigated in detail and emphasized that the collection of the essential data should
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be organized internationally.
   While ECAFE's report deeply impressed the Commission of ECAFE, in order to 
proceed practically it was essential tohave the United States, which based its ideas on the 
ICA Report, reconciled to the proposals of the ECAFE report. This was possible only 
when all the Riparian Countries declared jointly that they were willing to cooperate on 
the joint use of the river and that the work should be done by ECAFE.
5 Evolution: 1957 to 1971 
5.1 The Establishment of the Mekong Committee in October 1957 
    While the United States was opposed to ECAFE's assuming the Mekong 
investigation project, it was not favorable for ECAFE that any other single ntity such as 
the United States arrogated the project. A need arose to set up an organization separate 
from ECAFE, but still under the influence of ECAFE. Wightman (ibid: p.190) explains 
the background of the establishment of the Mekong Committee, referring to C.V. 
Narashimhan, the then executive s cretary of ECAFE prior to formal establishment of the 
Mekong Committee in October 1957:
In May 1957 a meeting in Bangkok of experts from the four countries 
recommended that their governments establish a Committee for Coordination of 
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin. The idea and name were suggested by 
Narashimhan. He persuaded the four governments that there would be no great 
difficulty in getting aid for the Mekong Project if they came together in this way.
    The initiative taken by ECAFE is reflected in Chapter I -- Establishment 
Committee in the "Statute for the Committee for Coordination of Investigations 
Lower Mekong Basin" (1957) (the "Statute"):
of the 
of the
The Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin 
(hereinafter called the Committee) is established bythe Governments of Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam (hereinafter called the participating 
governments), in response to the decision taken by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (hereinafter called the Commission) at its 
thirteenth session.
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    At the same time, ECAFE's guidance tothe Mekong Committee was legally ensured 
in the Statute: 
    (1) Article 3: In accordance with decision of the Commission at its thirteen session, 
       the Secretariat of the Commission shall cooperate with the Committee in the 
        performance of the latter's functions; 
    (2) Article 5 (4): The Executive Secretary of the Commission or his representative 
        may at any meeting make either oral or written statements concerning any 
        questions under consideration; 
    (3) Article 6: The Committee shall submit reports to participating governments and 
       annually to the Commission. 
    The Mekong Committee is responsible tothe Riparian Countries and Article 4 of 
the Statute stipulates its functions: 
    The functions of the Committee are to promote, coordinate, supervise and control 
    the planning and investigation f water esources development projects in the lower 
    Mekong basin. To these nds the Committee may: 
    (1) prepare and submit plans for coordinated research, study and investigation; 
    (2) make requests on behalf of the participating governments forspecial financial 
        and technical ssistance and receive and administer separately such financial nd 
         technical ssistance.... 
    (3) draw up and recommend toparticipating governments criteria for the use of the 
        water of the main river for the purpose of water esources development. 
   The relationship between ECAFE and the Mekong Committee created the 
characteristics of the Mekong Development Scheme in terms of economic ooperation. 
Wightman (ibid: p.199) describes it as follows: 
    The Mekong Project is a unique example of Asian governments setting up a 
    permanent organization for the joint planning and execution of a program that 
    requires substantial external id. A notable degree of cooperation a d mutual trust --
    not present at the beginning -- had developed among the members of the 
    Committee. In the earlier Committee meetings there was a strong tendency for the 
    four countries to look at the Mekong Project in terms of what each got out of it in 
                         89
the way of aid.... The habit of looking at the river as a whole had to be fostered.
5.2 Expanding the Organization of the Mekong Committee: 1957 to 1963 
    The Mekong Committee started its operation with an encouraging financial grant 
from France. The first important task was an independent evaluation of the ICA Report 
and the ECAFE Report for reconciliation purposes. This was done by the mission led by 
Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the 
"Mission"). It should be noted here that Wightman (ibid: p.191) stresses that "It is worth 
noting that there was nothing in the Wheeler Missions terms of reference tosuggest any 
doubt about he viability of the Mekong Project." The Mission's report, Programme of
Studies and Investigations forComprehensive D velopment of the Lower Mekong River 
Basin, (the "Wheeler Report") was issued in January 1958. The Wheeler Report 
recommended a program of investigations reflecting the ICA Report as a five-year 
undertaking, with first priority to the main river, including the sites suggested bythe 
ECAFE Report, with the estimated cost. 
    In 1958 the Mekong Committee created an Advisory Board of three engineers in
accordance with one of the recommendations of the Wheeler Report. In 1959 the 
Mekong Committee further strengthened its power to control and coordinate by 
appointing an Executive Agent with ancillary staff too make day-to-day decisions and to 
deal with donor governments and agencies. Wightman (ibid: p194) summarizes the 
situation:
By the middle of 1961 the Mekong Project had grown to 28 separate and distinct 
subprojects emanating from and financed by 11 different countries and 10 United 
Nations agencies.
    According to the Interim Committee for Co-ordination of Investigation of the 
Lower Mekong Basin, 1986 Annual Report, the Office of the Executive Agent and its 
staff was formally organized into the Office of the Secretariat (the "Mekong Secretariat") 
in 1963 "to plan, direct and co-ordinate the many studies, investigations and other 
activities included in the annual work programs."
5.3 Progress of the Mekong Development: 1962 to 1971 
    Reconciliation of the two different approaches towards the Mekong Development 
was made by the Wheeler Report. However, Economic and Social Aspects of Lower
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Mekong Development, he Ford Foundation-sponsored Report of 1962, (the "White 
Report") produced by the team headed by Gilbert F. White, had the effect of delaying the 
construction of the main stream dams. This is because the White Report recommended to 
seek relevant economic and social data for the first time, and suggested tributary projects 
to be completed prior to development of he main stream dams in order for the Mekong 
Committee to utilize the limited management resources. Wightman (ibid: p.196) 
describes the first step towards development of ributary projects: 
    To develop the resources of the Mekong is a long-term undertaking. 
    Understandably the four countries arc anxious to get practical results in the shortest 
    possible time. When, therefore, a Japanese t am reconnoitered the major tributaries 
    and reported that certain sites on them were so obviously promising that detailed 
    investigations could begin straightway the Committee readily agreed. Four sites, 
    one in each country, were selected and the United Nations Special Fund made a 
    grant for the preparation  each of them of a comprehensive feasibility report in a 
    form suitable for loan applications.
    The United States changed its approach from a bilateral basis to a regional basis after 
the then President Lyndon B. Johnson's speech at John Hopkins University. According to 
Friesen (1999: pp.97-98), between 1962 and 1971, a total of eight dams were completed 
for its construction on the tributaries (three for Laos and five for Thailand) and four were 
under construction (one for Cambodia nd three for Thailand). 
    Although both Cambodia and Laos had dam construction sites where 
counterinsurgency was active, the progress of each country was different. Laos could 
complete the three dams as planned, while Cambodia could not complete the first and 
last planned one in spite of continuous support from international ssistance. Black (ibid: 
pp.136-137) elaborates:
Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos has agreed with his communist half-brother, 
Prince Souphanouvong, that it should be built. The contractor isa Japanese firm.... 
The Father Lao representative in the Laotian capital of Vientiane assured the 
Japanese Embassy there on several occasions that his army did not intend to impede 
construction atthe dam site.
The Mekong Committee's first project in Cambodia is on a tributary of the main
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    stream called Prek Thnot. I had hoped that the U.S. Government would contribute 
    to this project, too, but it turned out to be impossible while American soldiers in 
    Vietnamm were being fired on from Cambodian territory (though not by 
    Cambodians).Perhaps it is just as well, for the Japanese agreed to take the lead with 
    Prek Thnot. They put up one-third of the $27 million needed; western European 
    countries and India and Pakistan are putting up one-third; and Cambodia itself, the 
     remainder. 
    Regarding the progress of the main stream projects, the Report on Indicative Basin 
Plan, which was completed in 1970, ("the 1970 IBP") was made public by the Mekong 
Committee in 1971. The 1970 IBP presented a range of development al ernatives to the 
Mekong Committee, dividing them into the short term (1971-1980) and the long term 
(1980-2000). The 1970 IBP envisioned the completion of four mainstream sites (Pa 
Mong, Stung Treng, Sambor and the'Fonle Sap barrage) inthe 1980s. 
6 Demise: 1970 to the 1990s 
6.1 Prelude to Demise: 1970 to 1975 
    The United States tried to stabilize South Vietnam by its military forces and the 
confrontation reached its peak in April 1969 when more than 543,000 American soldiers 
were serving in South Vietnam. However, the situation could not be turned around. The 
takeover of the Laotian government by the Father Lao in 1970 and the ousting of the 
Sihanouk regime in Cambodia extended the battlefields to much of Laos and Cambodia, 
as well as the Mekong Delta. Accordingly, all the potential mainstream development sites 
became battlefields, constraining activities of the Mekong Committee and shifting its 
activities inThailand and some parts of Laos. Towards May 1972, the number of the U.S. 
military forces decreased sharply so as to be ready to retreat from Indochina. 
   The changing regional setting during this period had a crucial impact on the 
funding channel, one of the prominent features of the Mekong Development Scheme. 
The total contribution to the Mekong Committee dropped from about 95 million US 
dollars in 1969 to about 35 million US dollars in 1971. Jacobs (1992: pp.147-148) 
further elaborates: 
    Funding from traditionally strong committee sponsors dwindled to almost nothing. 
   Within the basin, Thailand also failed to contribute any funds to the Committee 
   during 1970 (Thailand has been historically the largest contributing nation to the 
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    Committee, donating substantially more than the U.S. Thailand had given over 
   $US 60 million to the Committee by the end of 1969), further contributing tothis 
    large drop-off. 
    Eroding confidence r garding the future of the Mekong Scheme loomed up ahead, 
not only for the Mekong Committee, but also for the international donors. 
6.2 A Turning Point in the Mekong Development Scheme in 1975 
    A "Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilization of the Waters of the Lower 
Mekong Basin" (the "1975 Joint Declaration"), was made among the Riparian Countries, 
prior to the drastic political change of three governments of the four Riparian Countries 
in 1975. Because of competing sovereign i terests, the 1975 Joint Declaration prescribed 
restriction on the mainstream development i  Article 10:
    Mainstream waters are a resource ofcommon interest not subject to major unilateral 
    appropriation by any Riparian State without prior approval by the other Basin 
    States through the Committee. 
    The two new communist governments of Laos and Vietnam resumed participation 
in the Mekong Committee after a two-year absence since 1975. However, Cambodia, 
under the new Khmer Rouge government with radical Maoist ideology, which would 
undergo further political turmoil, did not return until 1995 when the Mekong 
Committee was transformed into the Mekong River Commission. 
    The political change also caused the United States, one of the leading players, to 
withdraw from the Mekong Development Scheme and it did not join the Committee 
after 1975.
6.3 The Demise of the Mekong Development Scheme: after 1975 
    Regional armed conflicts and instabilities continued until the 1991 Paris Peace 
Agreements. During this period, there was little progress on the Mekong Development 
Scheme, not only for physical reasons due to the war or insurgencies, but also because of 
the legal binding of Article 10 of the 1975 Joint Declaration. Only exceptional activities 
by the Mekong Secretariat have brought results of the revision of the 1970 IBP twice. The 
1970 IBP was revised in 1987 to downsize the development plans as seen in Perspective
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for Mekong Development, a d further modified in 1994 for the Run-of-River style' as 
seen in Mekong Mainstream Run-of-River Hydropower. 
    The funding function of the Mekong Development Scheme was also deteriorating 
after the United States' withdrawal. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
which replaced ECAFE, the founder of the Mekong Development Scheme, also reduced 
its contributions. Because of continuing armed conflicts and following economic 
sanctions, Laos and Vietnam were left in a severe financial position. Friesen (ibid: p.186) 
notes:
    Two of the Mekong Countries had to borrow money from the UNDP simply to pay 
    their annual Mekong Committee dues back to their sponsoring agency, the UNDP 
    Throughout the 1990s, the regional and international settings for the Mekong 
Development Scheme had drastically changed. 
    In regional settings, the Mekong River is not an economic unit any longer in light 
of a lack of economic cooperation between the Riparian Countries due to different 
political and economic positions. On the contrary, "For the first time in history, there was 
competition for water in the Mekong River Basin" as Browder (1998: p.l) points out. 
    In international settings, as Friesen observes (ibid: p.289); 
    ...the impact of the environmental and social lobbies within Europe and North 
    America has made it virtually untenable for European and North American 
    governmental aid agencies to consider the possibility of funding dams on the 
    Mekong mainstream. 
    Because there is no common ground for the Riparian Countries to go forward 
towards economic cooperation, and funding channels through external aid are cut off, 
there is no escape from demise for the Mekong Development Scheme. 
7 The TVA in the Context of the Mekong Development Scheme 
    It will be generally accepted to say that the consecutive wars and armed conflicts in
° A R
un-of-River style dam is a kind of dam, 
purpose of hydroelectric production from the 
reservoirs.
which is built only for the 
river stream, and thus does
one primary 
not construct
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the Mekong Region had a direct and most serious impact on the Mekong Development 
Scheme. However, it was also the war that expanded the TVAs activities. Twenty dams 
were built in the first twenty ears, and out of twenty, twelve dams were completed at 
once during the Second World War by the TVA. There was huge demand for electricity 
by war industries, from chemicals toaircraft production, and, most of all, on the part of 
the Manhattan Project o produce an atomic bomb. 
    TVA-style regional development eeds along time and large-scale investment. Even 
the TVA had struggled for the initial periods, Finer (1944: p.26) points out: 
    It is important to observe that the sales of 1933 had less than doubled by 1938 --up 
    to that year the T.V.A. had a financial deficit --and that only from the year 1939 was 
    there the beginning of a very sharp expansion tothe considerable total and profits of 
   1942.
    Finer (ibid: p.215) also describes the change of responses from people: 
    When the T.V.A. entered the Valley, it was met, as it were, by a large question 
    mark.... As the full breadth of the TVA.'s multi-purpose programme became 
    clearer, and each branch of its benefits became more manifest o the public in 
    practical development, the question mark was replaced by a note of enthusiasm and 
    of co-proprietorship. A very large proportion of the population ow talk of "our 
    dams" and "our T.V.A.° with pride. 
    'lhe Mekong Development Scheme could not even reach the stage of the test for 
their spirit of cooperation, where the Riparian Countries had to decide to share and 
allocate the costs, benefits, and methods of operating projects. However, the Mekong 
Development Scheme was found to set up the first international cooperation system for 
regional development i  Asia. Wightman (ibid: p.200) states: 
    In the Coordination Committee, the Mekong Project has also created a unique 
    instrument for channeling bilateral aid in support of a multilateral operation under 
    United Nations auspices. If the Committee constitutes the "board of directors," the 
    Commission, towhich it annually reports, embodies the "shareholders." 
    Table 1 shows operational financial resources by section and group under the 
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Mekong Development Scheme as of 31 December, 1971 when the Mekong Development 
Scheme had started to lose its funding functions. The total amount of investment is 
equivalent to US$213,975,891. Around 33% of total investment was spent for pre-
investment and planning activities for the Mekong Project, while 67% went to the Dam 
Construction in the Riparian Countries respectively. While the total investment amount 
for the Dam Construction is US$144,363,772, the amount of contributions from the 
Riparian Countries is about US$93,168,904. Therefore, the Riparian Countries gained 
the subtracted amount of US$51,194,868 from international donors tinder the Mekong 
Development Scheme.
Table 1 Operational Financial Resources as of 31 Dec. 1971 (Unit: US $ Equivalent)
Pre-investment
Investigation
and Planning
Investment for
Construction
Total
Riparian
Countries
19,555,333
28%
73,613,571
51%
93,168,904
44%
21% 79% 100%
Other
Countries
32,845,165
47%
69,734,876
48%
102,580,041
48%
32°/a 680/c 100%
UN groups
& NGOs
17,211,621
25%
1,015,325
1%
18,226,946
8%
94% 6% 100%
Total
69,612,119
100%
144,363,772
100%
213,975,891
100%/a
33% 67°/a 100%
Source; Calculated based on Huddle (1972 p.52} 
    Table 2 shows the breakdown of the contribution of the Riparian Countries in order 
to see each position. White Thai's contribution is noteworthy, those of the other Riparian 
Countries are very low. 
Table 2 Breakdown of the Riparian Countries from Table 1
Pre-investment
Investigation
and Planning
Investment for
Construction
Total
i
Cambodia
3,491,583
5%
9,328,100
6%
12,819,683
6%
27°/a 73% 100%
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3,030,121 934,500
1%
3,964,621
2%Laos
I 76% 240/, 100%'
Thai
10,369,786
15%
52,330,969
36%
62,700,755 ~_
17%' 83% 100°/a
29%
2,663,842', 11,020,000
8%
13,683,842
7%Vietnam ----
19%1
4%
81% 1000/0
Total 19,555,333 28% 73,613,571 51% 93,168,904 44%
Source. Calculated based on Hudd'.e (ibid: p.52)
8 Conclusion 
    This paper described the history of the Mekong Development Scheme, from its 
evolution to demise as the first Asian initiative towards economic integration. The 
Mekong Development Scheme developed the first international cooperation system for 
regional development in Asia. The system has been succeeded by the Greater Mekong 
Subregion Program since the early 1990s, operated by the Asian Development Bank. 
    Our findings in this paper suggest one rationale behind these schemes with current 
implications. 'The Mekong Development Scheme was not only unable to move forward 
but also started to lose its function because of Cambodia. Cambodia played a critical role 
in terms of regional cooperation despite its unassuming presence in the international 
society. These countries of the Mekong region definitely continue to need economic 
cooperation secured under institutions or organizations which understand the regional 
settings. 
    Superpowers uch as the United States and China could do whatever they think it 
would be reasonable in their own countries, using their own technology, funds, and 
political power. There is not much room for superpowers to seek the regional economic 
cooperation system needed by smaller countries like Laos or Cambodia. 
    Ironically, TVA-style hydro development came back in the early 1990s and has been 
continued in the upper reaches of the Mekong River in China in spite of international 
concerns and criticism. Nobody could stop China. 
    Decision-making by the local communities should be respected as a matter of 
course. However, it should not be overlooked that the local communities and their 
relations to the central governments in Laos or Cambodia and those in the Tennessee 
Valley have never been the same in many aspects. This author suggests that external 
researchers should pay more attention to the point that smaller countries still need such 
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regional economic development system as we have discussed in this paper. 
    Environmental conservation is important, but this paper concludes that all the 
factors of economic cooperation, economic development, and environmental concerns are 
reasonably balanced on a regional basis, especially in light of the needs of smaller 
countries in the Mekong Region. 
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